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One of the objectives of educational worlt in public affairs by the Minnesota 
Agricultural Extension Service is to develop a general understanding of the 
problems of agriculture and the broad range of policy alternatives. The 
role of. agricultural extension education in regard to the forthcoming wheat 
referendum is to present facts and to suggest the consequences of alternative 
choices. 
On May 21, t963, you have the opportunity to help make an important decision 
regarding alternative wheat programs for 1964. 'To do this as an informed 
citizen you will need to study the current wheat situation, the alternative 
programs open to you and the consequences of your choice-- for you, your 
community and your country.. Facts concerning the program and an economic 
analysis of alternatives are not the only basis for your decision. Your 
attitude concerning government programs, freedom, income security, and 
concern for the welfare of others should also be considered. Short run gains 
must be compared to less welllmown long-run impacts. Only you can decide 
your position on these issues. 
This publication is concerned with the forthcoming wheat referendum. It 
attempts to present factual information; an analysis of wheat program alterna-
tives; and key considerations. No conscious attempt has been made to tell 
you how to vote. 
I THE WHEAT SITUATION 1/ 
The United States Agricultural industry is faced with a supply demand imbalance --
production capacity exceeds needs at recent price levels. For no commodity is 
the imbalance greater than in the case of wheat. Except during and immediately 
after World Warn wheat output generally has increased more rapidly than 
effective demand. In the absence of government programs the result was low 
prices and incomes. With government programs, prices and incomes have 
been higher; producer decisions have been restricted; and government stocks 
have accumulated. During the 1950's government stocks of wheat have continued 
to grow despite the stiffest acreage controls in history and despite surplus 
disposal efforts at home and overseas. 
Annual production averaged 50 million bushels greater than utilization (including 
government disposal) during the 1954-61 period. By 1961 CCC owned 1300 
million bushels of wheat --- almost two times annual domestic and dollar 
export needs. The size and cost ~ CCC stocks together with increasing yields 
per acre, stable domestic use, and the possibility of shrinking dollar markets 
abroad imply an adjustment is needed in wheat production --- fewer resources 
are needed. 
Present government involvement with wheat traces to the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act of 1938. It established the basic mechanism of acreage allotments and 
non recourse loans for price and income support of the basic crops including 
wheat. This basic policy had not changed materially until passage of the 1162 
farm act. A later section explains in detail these changes which are scheduled 
to go into effect for the 1964 crop. 
Under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, wheat acreage was reduced 
from 80 million in 1938 to 55 million in 1942. During the war, restrictions 
were lifted and acreage reached 84 million in 1949. Acreage allotments and 
marketing quotas were reinstated for the 1954 crop. The legal minimum 
national allotment of 55 million acres has been in effect since 1954, though it 
was cut 10 per cent for the 1962 crop. The 1963 acreage allotment is again 
55 million acres. A voluntary diversion program was in effect in 1962 and will 
be in 1963. 
Production of wheat since 1958 has ranged between 1, 000 and 1,455 million 
bushels. The 1962 crop, lowest in recent years, was 1092 million bushels. 
Historically wheat has been a major export commodity. As the agriculture d. 
war-torn countries recovered following W<rld War n, U. S. exports declined 
to 215 million bushels in 1953. The dollar market has been maintained at about 
150 million bushels per year since that time through a government export subsidy 
to make u. s. wheat competitive on wotti markets. In addition since 1954 export 
sales under a variety of government programs, especially sales for foreign 
currency has increased. As a result total exports have exceeded 660 million 
bushels in 1960-61 and 700 million in 1961-62. 
Y Adapted from "An Analysis of Policy Alternatives for Wheat" Robert W. 
Wilcox, Farm Policy Alternatives, U.s. D. A. F. E. S. March 1963. 
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Domestic use as food has changed little since 1935, ranging from 471 - 494 
million bushels. Increasing population has made up the difference lost from 
decreasing per capita consumption. Total domestic disappearance totals about 
600 million in recent years. Thus dollar exports and P. L. 480, exports of 
wheat in total have exceeded domestic utilization in recent years. 
The present wheat situation illustrates the problem. (See Table 1.) The 
U. S. wheat supply for the current marketing year (1962 production and 
July 1, 1962 carryover) was about 2402 million bushels. Total disappearance 
for 1962-63 is estimated by U.s. D. A. at Ul7 million bushels. .1\bout 607 million 
bushels are expected to be used domestically, and exports may reach 570 million 
bushels. Thus carryover July 1 could be about 1225 million bushels, down 
slightly (1 06 million) from a year ago and compared to 1036 million in 1955 
and 425 million in 1950. 
For the year 1963-64 production outlook is up. Assuming a harvested acreage 
of 4 7 million acres under the 1963 voluntary wheat program and a continuation 
of the upward trend in yields, the resulting crop could be 1225 million bushels. 
Assuming a carryover of 1225 million bushels, imports of 5 million and a 
production of 1, 225 million, the total supply for the 1963-64 marketing year 
would provide a total supply of 2455 million bushels. Based on projected 
estimates of exports and domestic use, carry over stocks July,l, 1964, will be 
approximately 1235 million bushels. 
Table 1. Estimated Supply and Distribution of all Wheat; and Dollar and Government 
Financed E~c;>rts; by C~ Years 
Est. Forecast 
1957-58 1958-59 1959-60 1960-61 1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 
Million bUshels 
Stocks, July 1 909 882 1296 1314 1411 1305 1225 
Production 956 1457 1121 1357 1235 1092 1225 
Imports 11 8 7 8 6 5 5 
Supply 1876 2347 2424 2679 2652 2402 2455 
Exports 403 443 510 662 718 570 625 
Domestic disappearance 591 608 600 606 629 607 600 
Stocks, June 30 882 1296 1314 1411 1305 1225 1235 
-- - - --- ------ - -- --- ------ - -- - - -- - -- - -- - - - -
1957-61 
Exports* average 
Dollar sales 113 113 101 209 202 
Government program 214 248 312 357 405 
Total 327 361 413 566 607 
Percent Govt .Program 66 69 76 64 67 68 
*Grain only; does not Include flour. 
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II PROGRAM: FEATURES-- WHEAT PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES 
The Food and .Agricultural Act of 1962 provides, among other things, a wheat 
referendum in which producers may vote on a wheat program for 1964 and sub-
sequent crops. The referendum for the 1964 wheat crop year will be held 
May 21, 1963, 
If at least two-thirds of the producers voting vote ''Yes", a new program 
involving restricted wheat acreage, a two-price plan, and price supports will 
be put in effect. 
If more than one-third of the producers voting vote ''no" then the 1962 law 
specifies a program of no mandatory acreage restrictions for 1964; price 
supports at 50% of parity for producers complying with their acreage allotment; 
and no price support for producers exceeding their allotments. 
Regardless of the referendum vote in 1963, the Food and .Agriculture Act of 1962 
calls for another referendum in 1964. 
The following is a summary of principal features of the 1964 wheat program 
alternatives specified in the 1962 act. 
A. THE "YES" PROGRAM ALTERNATIVE 
Under the law the Secretary of Agriculture has set the national wheat acreage 
allotment for 1964 at 49,5 million acres. That's about 10% less than 1963 when 
the 55 mtllion acre national minimum allotment was still in effect. Acreage 
allotment cannot be set below that which the Secretary of .Agriculture determines 
necessary to produce one billion bushels of wheat, 
Land Diversion & Diversion Payments* 
Mandatory 
Each producer's 1964 acreage allotment will be 10% below his 1963 allotment 
(or acreage grown 59-61) He will be required to divert this difference into 
conservation use. For this diversion, he will be eligible for diversion payments 
at the rate of 30% of the basic county support price times his normal yield per 
acre. The assigned normal yield in Minnesota is 26.4 bu. per acre and range 
at the county level between 19 and 31 bushels per acre. For example, a man 
with 30 acres in 1963 would get a 1964 allotment of 27 acres --the 3 acres 
must go into conservation uses. With a normal yield of 24 bu. per acre and 
county price support of $2. 00, the diversion payment would be (24 x $2.00 x 
30%) $14.40 per acre. This provision for payment on mandatory diversion is 
effective through the 1965 crop year only, 
• Diversion payments are authorized for 164 and '65 only. 
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Volunta!Y. 
Each producer may divert up to an additional 20% of his 1964 allotment or an 
acreage which would bring the total farm diversion (including above manc:!atory) 
acreage to 15 acres. The payment for voluntary diversion will be at the rate 
of 50% of the basic county support price times the normal yield per acre, In 
the example above, 12 additional acres (1.5 less 3) could be voluntarily retired. 
The diversion payment for this voluntary acreage diversion would be (24 x $2. 00 
x 50%) $24. oo per acre, 
A producer with a 1964 allotment of 13.5 acres or less may divert all his 
wheat land at this higher diversion rate. Payments for voluntary diversion are 
currently provided for through 1965, 
Use of Diverted Acres 
As in the past, the county ASCS committees will decide, on the basis of 
guidelines given them by the USDA and the Minnesota ASCS State Committee, 
what will be accepted as "proper" use of diverted acres. Grazing, or planting 
of certain crops will be allowed at lower diversion payment rates. 
Penalty for Overplanting 
Overplanting will result in the loss of price support and diversion payments 
and a penalty of 65% of parity or about $1.55 per bushel. This penalty may be 
postponed and the producer may be made eligible for price support by storing 
the excess production. Wheat so stored may be marketed later without penalty 
because of a less than normal crop, or by paying the marketing quota penalty. 
In addition the producers future allotment would be reduced if he exceeds his 
allotment in 1964. 
Price Support 
The basic price support rate ($2. 00 per bushel) will apply to wheat used domesti-
cally for food and to part of the export wheat. In Minnesota it will range between 
$2.08 and $2,23 per bushel. The USDA indicates that the $2.00 rate will apply 
to 975 million bushels in 1964. This amount of wheat is called the ''national 
marketing allocation" and will amount to about 80% of normal production on the 
1964 acreage allotment. For 1965 and later years the basic support rate will 
be set by the Secretary at from 65 to 90% of parity, which is a range of $,_. 60 
- $2. 20, 
Wheat grown in excess of the farm marketing allocation* will be eligible for 
support at a national average of $1. 30 per bushel for 1964. In Minnesota this 
will likely range from $1.38 to $1. 53. For subsequent years, these support 
prices will be set at such level as the Secretary determines according to the 
provisions of the law. 
*Note that the farm marketing allocation Is wheat which can be supported at $2. 
It's also called "certificate" wheat in view of the way it will be identified. The 
farm marketing quota Is all wheat grown on alloted acres. 
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The "blend" price will be between $1.30 and $2.00 for most producers. The 
following examples (using national average prices and assuming that the entire 
production is marketed) are included to illustrate average prices: 
1. Assuming an 80% national marketing allocation a farmer who plans his alloted 
acres and produces his exact normal yield per acre will average $1 .• 86 per 
bushel (.8 x $2.00 + .2 x $1.30 = $1.86) 
2. A farmer whose production is greater than normal production will average 
less than $1.. 86 per bushel. For example, a producer with a normal yield of 
25 bushels per acre who actually produces 40 bushels per acre will receive 
$2 per bushel for 20 bushels (25 x 80%) and $1_. 30 per bushel for 20 bushels. 
The average price for his entire production then will be $1. 65. 
3. A farmer who produces only 80 percent or less of his normal production due 
to low yields or voluntary diversion will receive $2 per bushel for his entire 
production. 
B. TFE "NO" PROGRAM ALTERNATIVE 
If more than one-third of the farmers voting in the referendum vote "no", the 
national acreage allotment will be the same as the ''yes" program, 49.5 million 
acres for 1964. There will be no payments for diversion of land and no compulsory 
diversion. There will be no penalty for overplanting. Powever, overplanting in 
1964 will result in a reduction in future allotment as under previous programs. 
Also, price support will not be available to those overplanting. Those who plant 
within their acreage allotments will be eligible for price supports at 50% of the 
parity price, about $1_.25 national average. 
With a loan rate of 50% of parity (about $1. 25) and assuming wheat producers 
comply to a large degree with acreage allotments, wheat prices could be eXP6cted 
to average near the loan rate. 
However, if a large percentage of the producers do not comply with allotments, 
there will be a corresponding increase in production assuming yields equal to 
those of recent years. This would suggest that wheat prices would tend toward 
the level of feed grain prices --- $1.10- $1.20 per bushel. Therefore, unless 
new legislation affecting 1964 wheat were passed, cash wheat prices probably 
would fall somewhere between 50% of parity and feed grain prices (between $1.10 
- $1. 40). The actual level of feed grain prices is unknown and will depend upon 
the outcome of feed-grain legislation in the current congress. 
Small Allotment Farms 
The old provision allowing fifteen acres without penalty and 30 acres for feed 
without penalty is out. Under the 1964 program, small allotment farmers,-- those 
who grew wheat under the fifteen acre exemption, may choose whether to partici-
pate in the program as an allotment grower. However, he may vote in the referen-
dum only if he chooses to be considered an allotment grower. 
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Participation 
The small wheat farmer who wishes to vote in the referendum must so indicate 
to ASCS at least seven days prior to balloting May 13. The back of the notice 
of farm allotment has a space for this purpose. This will make him subject to 
the acreage allotment and marketing quota provisions. His farm allotment will 
be the larger of (1) '59-'61 average seeding reduced by the percentage the 
national acreage allotment is reduced from 55 million acres (about 10%), or 
(2) the acreage allotment determined in the same manner as the allotment on 
larger (over 15 acre allotment) farm based on the farm's '53 - 162 wheat 
acreage. If he complies with this allotment, he is eligible for price supports 
and land diversion payments. However, if all of the wheat allotment on the 
farm is voluntarily diverted, there will be no marketing allocation for the farm. 
For participating small farms, land diversion payments will be made for the 
mandatory diversion. Additional payments for voluntary diversion will be 
available since the small farmer with 13.5 acres or less wheat allotment may 
divert voluntarily up to the full amount of his allotment plus the mandatory 
diversion. 
Non-participation 
If he chooses not to participate in the wheat referendum, he can grow without 
penalty: (1) his acreage allotment figured as previously, or (2) an average of 
his '59 .J 61 seeding not to exceed 15 acres, whichever is larger. As a non-
participant, such a grower is not eligible for price supports, for land diversion 
payments, or to vote in the referendum. 
C. OTHER POSSffiLE ALTERNATIVES 
The 1962 Food and Agriculture Act provisions dealing with wheat are scheduled 
to be implemented in 1964 subject to the outcome of the referendum. Thus 
alternatives are confined to the "yes" and ''no" implication of the referendum. 
Congress retains unto itself the right and responsibility to pass additional 
legislation at any time. This leaves the possibility of additional legislation for 
consideration. New legislation would be more likely in case of a ''no" vote. 
Some bills have already 
been introduced. Any number of alternatives would be possible. Among those 
that would likely receive consideration are: 
1. Continuation of the 1962 -63 program of price supports, acreage allotments, 
and a voluntary diversion program. 
2. A program of lower support price for wheat set at the higher of the average 
world price of wheat during the three preceding years (about $1.30) or 50% 
of parity (about $1.22); no acreage allotments or marketing quotas, and a 
voluntary cropland retirement program including features for whole farm 
retirement. 
SUMMARY 
Wheat Program Provisions, 1964 Referendum 
''Yes" Vote "No" Vote 
Acreage Allotments 
49. 5 million acres 
(compliance mandatory) 
49.5 million acres (same as with 
"yes " vote) 
(Compliance voluntary) 
Mandatory Diversion 
About 10% of 1963 farm allotment None 
Voluntary Diversion 
Up to 20% of 1964 farm allotment None 
Diversion Payments 
30% of support level times normal None 
yield for mandatory diversion 
50% of support level times normal 
yield for volunta't'y diversion Nme 
Penalty for Overplanting 
65% of parity on twice normal Loss of price support and reduction 
production from excess acres of allotment history 
or on actual production and 
reduction of allotment history 
Price Support 
$2 national average on about 80% 50% of parity to farmers complying 
of normal production on acreage with acreage allotments 
allotment 
$1. 30 national average on rest of 
production 
~ \._This means $1. 86 average price 
assuming normal production and no 
voluntary land retirement (80% x 
$2 + 20% X $1.30- $1. 86~p 
No price supports to noncomplying 
farmers 
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III. General Considerations - Analysis 
The basic problem in the wheat economy and American agriculture generally is 
that too many resources (land, labor and capital such as machinery) are devoted 
to agricultural production relative to consumers' desires. Key agricultural 
policy decisions involve choices regarding how best to remove some of these 
resources. The alternatives presented in the 1964 referendum are by no means 
the only alternatives and perhaps not the best of all possible alternatives with 
respect to wheat. The basic choice facing wheat producers in the referendum 
is -- (1) will the resources devoted to wheat be reduced through mandatory 
government regulations with relatively higher level of prices and incomes for 
producers, or (2) will the incentive to remove resources in wheat production 
be left largely to the price system involving greater decision making freedom 
for producers but lower levels of prices and incomes. 
A suggested proposal not encompassed in the 1963 referendum is one involving 
government aids and guidance to achieve desired adjustment. 
Some producers may wish to assume that the basic decision could be delayed 
or modified once more, as it has been in the past, if Congress should deCide 
to pass an alternative law following the referendum. This is a possibility 
if a 11no 11 vote prevails. 
It is apparent that for the individual producer the question is one to be decided 
partially on economic considerations and also on his attitudes towards govern-
ment programs. Value judgments and attitudes are involved. 
The following are some general considerations as a farmer decides how he 
will vote in the forthcoming referendum. 
Income to wheat producers will be higher under a "yes 11 vote than a 11no 11 vote 
in the referendum for the year 1964. This probably also would be true in 1965 
although changes in price support levels, diversion payment rates and size of 
marketing allocation (certificate wheat) could alter the difference. Unless new 
legislation is forthcoming for the year 1966, diversion payments will cease and 
this makes the income difference between the two alternatives smaller. 
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Legislation for modifying the referendum 11no 11 vote to include lower support 
levels and land retirement features as proposed by some would result in lower 
incomes to wheat producers during the next couple of years. But this alternative 
would be accompanied by less restrictive government controls. 
Costs to government and consumers depends on the amount of export subsidy 
required, the method and amount of payments made for idling land, levels of 
support prices and wheat consumption patterns. Government costs would be 
lower under a 11no 11 referendum vote since support prices wruld be lower; no 
diversion payments would be required and export subsidy payments would be low. 
While wheat program costs would be lower, feed grain program costs would 
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increase under a feed grain program comparable to 1963. This would be due 
to increased government takeover of feed grain as a result of (a) increased 
use of wheat as feed and (b) a shift from wheat acreage to feed grain production. 
If enabling legislation to provide for a land retirement program were to be 
enacted following a "no" vote government costs would be higher compared to 
a "no'' vote program. 
The effect on cost of food to the consumer would be minor since the value for wheat 
relative to the retail price of wheat products is low. Consumer cost for food would 
be slightly higher with a "yes" vote. 
Feed Grain Program effects of the wheat referendum are difficult to measure. 
A 11no" vote would place additional pressures upon a feed grain program if it 
continues similar to the 1963 program. Wheat at feed grain prices would tend 
to bring down the price of other grains. If no legislation were passed to control 
wheat supplies, costs of operating an effective feed grain program would increase 
markedly. 
Land use and land value adjustments depend in part on the rigidities of marketing 
quotas in any supply management program. If marketing quotas are tied to the 
individual farm allotment as in the present "yes" referendum program the dis-
tribution of wheat production will change little. 
Under a "no" vote there will likely be a little shift to other feed grains in the 
major wheat producing states. The price of wheat would need to drop drastically 
(below 50% parity) relative to feed grains before acreage would be shifted to 
other grains. Throughout the Midwest small wheat growers will either plant 
within allotments or shift out of wheat completely, depending on how the wheat 
and feed grain program is tied together. In balance, wheat acreage would likely 
increase for at least a few years. In Minnesota, there could be a shift to wheat 
as feed grain substituting for oats in the cropping system in Southern Minnesota 
and for barlev in Northwest Minnesota. 
Higher prices and incomes due to past support programs have been partially 
capitalized into land values. A "yes" vote would tend to maintain or possibly 
increase this "artificial 11 price of land. A 11no 11 vote continued over a period 
of years undoubtedly will reduce land values in major wheat growing areas. 
Replacement legislatioH could temper this. 
The degree .of control of farm operations is markedly affected by the referendum 
vote. A "yes" vote indicates mandatory compliance with acreage allotments and 
tight restrictions on production and marketing of wheat. A "no" vote leaves 
compliance on a voluntary basis and fewer restrictions on production and 
marketing of wheat. 
Interregional competition in wheat production is also important. Wheat is 
produced in a number of overlapping regions in the United States. Classes and 
quality of wheat varies by regions and within regions. General quality character-
istics of hard red spring wheat produced in Minnesota, North Dakota, South 
Dakota and Montana differ in varying degrees from those of hard red winter, 
soft red winter or white wheat. Interregional differences in the wheat produced 
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form part of the basis for interregional competition in wheat. 
Hard red spring wheat production has not increased relative to that for some 
other classes, particularly hard red winter, produced largely in the central 
and southern great plains, consequently hard red spring wheat has not contributed 
as much to the surplus situation. Government programs generally have not 
adequately recognized this situation. 
If reductions in wheat quotas become progressively greater, output of high 
quality wheat may be reduced below needs. This may force the substitutions 
of lower quality wheats in many food uses. 
Historically, price differentials between classes of wheat have not been large. 
Adjustments in relative supply and in utilization are possible. Unfortunately, 
we don't know how rapidly they might occur if the price incentive to do so 
developed under conditions of reduced control over supply and price. The in-
fluence of a "no" vote on interregional competition is highly uncertain. 
Since over half of our wheat production moves into foreign markets, the effects 
of alternative wheat programs on exports are important though not entirely 
clear. As indicated earlier, our present ability to export wheat to markets 
that can pay in dollars is dependent upon payment of an export subsidy. But, 
many importing countries also have price support programs that tend to make 
price changes on our part ineffective. In the European Common Market, for 
example, a variable levy system on imports raises all wheat prices at least 
enough to maintain a given level of domestic prices. Lower wheat prices in 
the United states as a result of the ''no" referendum would not be expected to 
increase exports to the Common Market countries if they pursue their intention 
of expanding their own wheat productions. Rather, lower wheat prices in the 
United states could be offset by higher import levies in the Common Market 
countries. 
Whether or not lower prices would increase our competitive position relative 
to other exporters such as Canada depends upon our rates of export subsidy 
and the counter action they follow. Because of the importance of wheat exports 
to the economies of the major exporting countries it seems likely that they 
would take action to "meet our price." In the final analysis it seems unlikely 
that a large change in dollar exports is possible under any program alternative. 
While the above considerations are difficult to analyze they should at least be 
considered before making up your mind on your choice in the forthcoming wheat 
referendum on May 21. Be sure to vote! 
